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Concerns regarding the safety and integrity of the fresh produce supply chain are becoming all
too common in the media. In 2006, an outbreak of E. coli O157:H7 from farms in Central Ca-
lifornia sickened almost two hundred people and lead to the deaths of three.  Estimated costs to
the industry ranged from $100 per month to $200 million until spinach sales returned to normal.
By some accounts, the spinach industry has yet to recover and may not for years to come.  The
incident, however, has lead to a host of initiatives from industry officials, legislators and fresh
produce retailers to ensure the safety of fresh produce.  The necessary technology and best prac-
tices knowledge exists, yet some growers have not made the investment required to ensure that
such outbreaks do not happen again in the future.  
Investments in supply chain technology are clearly subject to cost-benefit decision criteria by
growers.  Their failure to adopt the necessary technology, therefore, raises a number of questi-
ons regarding the efficiency of the decision making process.  If growers follow traditional net
present value (NPV) investment criteria, they will invest only when the expected present value
of potential savings from avoiding a future outbreak exceed the initial capital cost.  This deci-
sion criteria, however, ignores two critical features of the problem.  First, much of the potential
savings (or avoided losses) accrues to the industry as a whole.  If an outbreak was to occur, there
is a strong likelihood that the equity of the firm would be immediately valueless.  This puts a
floor on the potential losses that biases expected losses upward.  On an industry-wide basis,
however, the value of the externality created is many times greater than the potential loss of
firm-specific value. 
Second, and perhaps more importantly for firm-specific decision making, the potential returns
to investments in food safety are inherently uncertain.  With an uncertain savings stream, a 
large fixed (and irreversible) cost of food safety investment, and a firm-specific opportunity to 
benefit from any investments made, the decision to invest or not entails a significant real option
value. Considering investments in a real option framework is by now commonplace in the in-
vestment literature (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994), but has only recently been applied in an agricul-
tural supply-network management context.  If an investment in a business practice or
technology includes a real option, then in order for investment to take place immediately the
present value of expected savings must exceed not only the initial capital cost, but the value of
the embedded option of waiting to make an investment.  Consequently, the more valuable the
option, the more expected potential savings must rise before an investment will be made.  Ex-
pected savings, in turn, depend on three primary factors: (1) the underlying volatility of returns
to growing the crop, (2) the probability of a discrete shock to returns, such as a food borne disea-
se outbreak, and (3) the inherent profitability of growing, packing and selling the crop.  Waiting
for a stochastic returns series to rise above an investment “trigger” level, therefore, gives rise to
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Real options can arise in a number of agricultural applications, including capacity choice in the
anhydrous ammonia industry (Stiegert and Hertel, 1997) and technology adoption by Texas
dairy farmers (Purvis, et al., 1995). In fresh produce, Price and Wetzstein (1999) show that
uncertainty and sunk investment costs can combine to cause the hurdle returns to establishing
or removing a peach orchard to diverge significantly from what traditional net present value
analysis would suggest.  Because the probability that a random returns process will exceed an
“investment trigger” level increases with time, we do not directly observe the gap between full-
cost and neoclassical hurdle rates in aggregate data.  Rather, we observe periods during which
neither investment nor disinvestment occurs despite considerable variability in returns (Abel
and Eberly, 
1994; Oude Lansink and Stefanou, 1997).  This is economic hysteresis.  In this study we esti-
mate the impact of hysteresis on the timing of investments in food safety technology, as a means
of explaining why growers and processors appear to be slow to adopt necessary protection
against food borne disease outbreaks. 
We demonstrate the impact of hysteresis using an ex ante analysis of investments in food safety
technology by a representative spinach farm in the Central Valley of California. We incorporate
many realistic features into the investment-decision simulation model: (1) stochastic returns to
growing spinach, both in terms of price and yield, (2) the probability of a discrete shock to re-
turns caused by a future food borne disease outbreak, (3) the potential for on-farm diversifica-
tion to reduce the volatility of farm-level returns and, thereby, exacerbate the hysteretic effect.
With this simulation model, we provide estimates of the likely severity of the hysteresis effect
in food safety investments and whether this phenomenon constitutes a likely explanation for the
observed unwillingness to invest. 
In the first section of the paper, we describe a theoretical model of hysteresis in food safety in-
vestments.  The empirical application of this model is outlined in the second section, including
a description of the data used and the simulation techniques that were employed.  The simula-
tion results are presented and discussed in the fourth section, while a fifth provides come con-
clusions and policy implications for how food safety measures can be crafted to ameliorate the
impacts of uncertainty and hysteresis. 
 
Economic Model of Food Safety Investment 
In order to evaluate an investment in food safety technology, defined in very general terms, it is 
first necessary to be very clear about the cash flows and initial investment involved.  The initial
investment, or cash outlay, is relatively simple.  Given that our focus is at the level of the indu-
stry, the investment involves a collective commitment of $4.0 million at t = 0 to establish
industrywide certification standards and monitoring body.  This investment also includes all of
the necessary detection technology for the testing staff to determine the presence of the most
likely set of pathogens at each facility (reference literature for value of investment ).  Cash flows
to the investment, however, are more difficult to ascertain.  We assume that establishing impro-
ved food safety detection and prevention technology and procedures has two effects: (1) redu-
cing the probability and severity of a one-time event occurring like the E. coli outbreak in the
Fall of 2006, and (2) preventing the erosion of goodwill (demand) over time that results from a
permanent loss of some consumers or foodservice buyers.  This latter effect means the preser-
vation of both shipments and prices that would otherwise be significantly lower following a
disease outbreak. In 2006, shipments in the five weeks prior to the outbreak averaged 1.216 m
lbs, falling to 0.626 m lbs per week during the scare.  Similarly, prices were $0.486 per lb prior
to the food scare, while they averaged $0.197 / lb during the food scare.  In the five weeks fol-
lowing, prices rebounded to $0.289 / lb., which is a level similar to the same five-week period
in prior years.  This suggests that the E. coli scare resulted in a dramatic, yet temporary reduc-Timothy J. Richards et al.   331
tion in total industry revenue of 79.1%. Over the longer run, however, it is more difficult to esti-
mate the total, ongoing impact on consumers’ perception of spinach.  Therefore, we assume a
permanent 10.0% downward shift in demand at each price level.  While arbitrary, this assump-
tion is supported by interviews with industry officials.  
With the assumptions made above, we define a stochastic process for the returns to an 
investment in food safety technology.  Consistent with the two effects outlined above, the po-
tential savings consists of an reversion of the demand curve of 10.0% as well as an elimination
of the one-time shock to prices and shipments.  Assuming a vertical short-run supply curve for
spinach, the incidence of the 10.0% shift in demand is assumed to lie entirely on prices, while
the one-time shock affects both prices and shipments.  For the continuous part of the returns pro-
cess, however, prices and shipments are negatively correlated with a correlation coefficient of
-0.40. 
Because the option value explanation for hysteresis is well understood, we present an outline of
the structure of such a model and focus our attention instead on its implications for estimating
and testing an empirical model of hysteresis in food safety investments.  Suppose an industry
organization faces the problem of determining whether to invest in quality screening technology
or processes that would greatly reduce the probability of a food borne disease outbreak.  Whe-
ther a for-profit firm, or an agent for a group of profit-maximizing growers, assume the organi-
zation chooses the amount of investment, I, in order to maximize the present value of returns to
an investment in technology or processes that reduce expected losses due to a food recall: 
                                                                                                                                           (1) 
where I0  is the amount of investment in food safety at time 0, Q is the volume of industry sales,
p is the grower price, c is (constant) marginal cost and è is a parameter that reflects the expected
savings in lost profit due to a disease outbreak (assumed to be 10.0%).  Managers of the 
association are assumed to maximize (1) subject to an equation of motion for annual net returns, 
where annual returns are given by: 
 Output is determined by the amount of investment in food safety, while prices are assumed
to be determined on the market and thus exogenous to the manager’s problem.  Consequently,
net returns evolve according to a Brownian motion process of the form: 
                                                                                                              (2) 
where ì is the drift rate per unit of time, dt, ? is the standard deviation of the process, and dz is
an increment of a standard Weiner process with zero mean and variance equal to dt. Returns are
assumed to follow a Brownian motion because per-period changes in returns are normally dis-
tributed, independent from each other, and short-run dynamics are dominated by the volatility
component whereas long-term dynamics are dominated by trend.  It is not likely, however, that
any trend away from the mean in (2) is likely to be sustained over the long-run as returns in com-332   Hysterisis in Food Safety Investments
petition cannot grow without bound, nor will they fall below zero for a sustained period of time.
Therefore, the process in (2) is modified to include a mean-reversion term so that:  
                                                                                                (3) 
where ê is the rate of reversion to the mean.  Further, returns are also subject to periodic “spikes”
or periods of virtually instantaneous change due to disease outbreaks or some other source of
negative market information.  We model these instances as jumps in the stochastic process esti-
mated above (Merton, 1976; Ball and Torous, 1983, 1985; Jarrow and Rosenfeld, 1984; 
Jorion, 1989, Naik and Lee, 1990; Bates, 1996; Hilliard and Reiss, 1999), so the most general 
form of the returns equation becomes: 
                                                                     (4)
where jumps occur according to a Poisson process q with average arrival rate ë and a random
percentage shock, ö. The random shock, in turn, is assumed to be log-normally distributed with
mean ö - 0.5ä2  and variance, ä2. The Poisson process q describes a random variable that assu-
mes a value of 0 with probability 1- ë and 1 with probability ë. 
The option to postpone making an investment in food safety technology is analogous to a finan-
cial call option.  We estimate the value of the real option using a risk-neutral valuation method
where the “strike price” is the amount of the initial investment and weekly returns provide pe-
riodic dividends. Risk neutral methods are appropriate because returns to spinach farming are
not likely to be correlated with the market portfolio (Cox, Ingersoll and Ross, 1985).  Risk neu-
tral valuation uses a three-stage algorithm.  First, we “risk neutralize” the returns process by
estimating (4) and removing all dynamics that are explainable by changes in the mean, by mean
reversion or by jump processes.  The remaining random variation is then a martingale, Q, and
dz becomes dv, where vt is a Q-Weiner process (Alaton, et al., 2002).  Second, we form an ex-
pectation of the intrinsic value of the derivative under the Q measure defined by our risk-
neutralized process.  Third, we discount the expected payoff value back to the current date at
the risk-free rate.  This discounted expected payoff is the market equilibrium price of the real
option.1 
More formally, given a constant market price of risk, ø, a constant rate of interest, r, and 
assuming each contract
 pays one dollar per unit of returns, the martingale that defines the underlying index becomes: 
where dv is now a Q-Wiener process (Alaton, et al., 2002).  Hull (2005), however, argues that
if the underlying is indeed statistically independent of the market portfolio, then the market pri-
ce of risk is zero.  Because this is likely to be case for localized insect populations, we set ø = 0
in (5) and proceed to price the derivative using the risk free discount rate. 
1. Although risk neutral valuation is typically applied in cases where the underlying is log-normally dis-
tributed, all that is required is that the adjusted probability distribution under which the expectation is 
taken be the one that is consistent with the underlying following a martingale (zero drift stochastic pro-
cess) (Harrison and Kreps  1979). For a recent application of this approach, and a review of whether or 
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Among all possible types of option, the ability to postpone an investment in food safety is akin
to a call option on the returns to making the investment.  A call option is the right, but not the
obligation to acquire an interest in the underlying process, which is here the stream of returns
generated by investing in better monitoring technology.  The expected payoff to a call option is
given by: 
, where rI is the annualized cost of the investment. This expectation must be found under Q-
measure.  Taking the expectation and discounting to the present from T at the rate r gives a call-
option value of:
 
where ìn and ón  are the mean and variance, respectively, of the returns process and Ö is the
standard normal distribution function.1 The expectation in (6) is found numerically using a
Monte Carlo simulation with 1,000 random draws of the continuous diffusion process and 100
independent draws of the discrete Poisson jump process (for a total of 100,000 random combi-
nations). 
Once the real option is priced, estimating the implied hysteresis effect is relatively straightfor-
ward.  Under traditional, Marshallian rules of investment, the decision maker invests when ex-
pected net revenue rises above the opportunity cost of invested capital, or: 
When the embedded option is taken into account, however, the decision criteria must
change to reflect the fact that net revenues must also cover the opportunity cost of exercising
the option: 
2
Because Vc  is always positive, this decision rule implies that the full-cost Rt trigger is higher
under real option relative to Marshallian rules.  Hysteresis arises because the process for net re-
venues is the same in either case – the decision maker will “wait longer” for the random returns
process to exceed the higher full-cost trigger than in the Marshallian case. We solve for the hy-
steretic effect by simulating the investment rule using Monte Carlo methods and comparing the
optimal time to invest between traditional NPV and real option objective functions.  
Data and Methods 
. 
The stochastic process in (4) is estimated using a sample of weekly shipments and prices for
spinach grown in California over the 288 week shipping period from April 2002 through Octo-
ber 2007. These data are derived from USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service sources.
Because this sample period includes the E. coli outbreak that occurred in the fall of 2006, the
data reflects at least once instance of a “spike” in demand.  This fact helps to identify the jump
1. The mean and variance found under Q-measure include the market price of risk and 
jump terms, but their specific form are not material here.  They have been derived, 
however, and are available from the authors.
2. Dixit and Pindyck (1994) provide an exact solution in terms of the parameters of the 
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component of the theoretical process described above.  Production costs are taken from Univer-
sity of California cost of production estimates for a representative spinach grower in Ventura
County, CA in 1999.  All cost estimates are inflated to reflect 2007 currency values.  Using an
average variable cost estimate of $0.30 per pound, the average weekly net revenue over the enti-
re sample period for the industry as a whole is $129,500.   
Estimates of (4) are obtained by maximum likelihood estimation over the entire sample data set,
using the likelihood function: 
where T is the total number of time-series observations, and N is defined as a number of jumps
sufficiently large to include all potential jumps in the observed data (six proved sufficient in this
application). Further, we approximate the change of R (dR )t t t t-1 with a discrete change: (R -R ).
 
Richards, Manfredo and Sanders (2004) demonstrate how this method can be used to estimate
a similar type of process in an application to derivatives based on temperature indices (weather
derivatives).  
Results and Discussion 
Table 1 provides the estimation results for the most general form of the net return process. Alt-
hough the results are not presented in this table, a specification testing procedure was conducted
to test among successively more comprehensive forms of the stochastic returns process. Likeli-
hood ratio tests compared a simple Brownian motion (BM) process, to a mean-reverting Brow-
nian motion (MR-BM) process, to a Brownian motion process with jump diffusion (JD-BM)
and, finally, to the mean-reverting, jump-diffusion BM (MR-JD-BM) process described above.
This testing procedure favored the MR-JD-BM process, so the results presented here are taken
from the preferred model.  As is evident from the parameter estimates presented in table 1, each
of the structural parameters is significantly different from zero, and of the expected sign. Spe-
cifically, the estimate of ë, the Poisson arrival parameter, suggests that a shock to demand can
be expected to occur 0.59 times during every 288 week period, or approximately once every ten
years.  This is consistent with industry experience.  When a shock does occur, returns are ex-
pected to fall by 10.7%, on average.  Although the E. coli scarce in 2006 reduced demands by
far more than 10.0%, this estimate likely understates the most extreme cases because it repre-
sents an average over many smaller instances.  Spinach returns increased by approximately
6.1% over the sample period, which reflects both higher prices and shipment levels prior to the
E. coli outbreak. Finally, spinach returns revert to the long-term mean at a rate of 34.2% per
week, which implies that any deviation is fully removed within three weeks.  Again, this is
broadly consistent with industry experience, although the most recent shock to demand lasted
considerably longer than this average-estimate. Timothy J. Richards et al.   335
Table 1. Stochastic Returns Process Estimates: MLE
Variable Estimate t-ration
In this table, a single asterisk indicates significance at a 5.0% level. 
Comparing the estimated LLF value to the null model LLF 
gives a chisquare test statistic value of 145.321.
The parameter estimates in table 1 were then used to simulate real option prices embedded 
in food safety investments.  Table 2 shows the option values obtained under a number of alter-
native assumptions regarding key model parameters.  Assuming base uncertainty (ó) and shock
(ö) values of 0.002 and -0.107, respectively, the baseline real option estimate is approximately
$8.8 million.  This means that any proposed investment in food safety of $5.0 million must ge-
nerate a returns with NPV of $8.8 million before it will rationally be undertaken, which is fully
66.0% greater than under traditional NPV rules.  As the level of uncertainty rises, the real option
value grows, reaching nearly $10.6 million under the base shock scenario at a standard deviation
of 0.004.  On the other hand, the real option results appear to be less sensitive to changes in the
value of the demand-shock parameter.  In fact, given that these results are generated through a
Monte Carlo simulation procedure, the variation in option value from one assumed value of ö
to the next is within any reasonable error-bound.  Future experimentation with this model will
consider larger potential shocks to demand to investigate whether or not the option value is in-
deed not sensitive to the potential loss if a future disease outbreak should occur again. 
 
ë   0.590*   9.372 
ó   0.002*   6.736 
ä   0.023*   4.137 
ì   0.061*   5.362 
ê   0.342*   13.026 
ö   -0.107*   -5.439 
Year 1   -0.001   -0.732 
Year 2   0.002   0.189 
Year 3   -0.024   -1.728 
Year 4   0.011   0.749 
Year 5   -0.012   -0.654 
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Table 2. Real Option Values for an Investment in Food Safety Technology ($,000)
The Values in this table represent the real option value of a $5.0 million investment i
n food safeety technology or processes in California spinach.
The economic significance of the real option values shown in table 2, however, suggest that a
hysteresis effect is likely to arise.  Table 3 shows the difference between the optimal time to in-
vest under traditional net present value returns, where weekly returns need only rise above the
current trigger value to instigate an investment, and the time to invest under “full cost” or real
option trigger values.  In the real option case, current returns must rise above not only the
weeklyequivalent opportunity cost of the initial investment, but the value of the real option as
well. Immediate investment implies that the grower has decided to exercise the option so current
returns must be sufficiently high to offset the value of the option that is being given up.  Table
3 shows the difference between these to “time to invest” values under a number of assumptions,
again regarding the key model parameters: the underlying volatility of the process, the Poisson
counter and the magnitude of the assumed jump in returns should a food safety event occur. In
interpreting these results, it is important to remember that our implicit assumption is that gro-
wers are rational decision makers.  That is, they follow the investment rule that is economically
correct (Real Option Rules) and not the rule that is suggested by traditional finance theory (Tra-
ditional NPV Rules). With this realization in mind, the results in table 3 show that growers can
be expected to wait far longer to make an investment in food safety technology than is expected
under traditional rules.  Specifically, under the base scenario (ó = 0.002, ö = -0.107), growers
would be expected to take 3.725 weeks from an initial period before investing under traditional
NPV rules, but 19.373 weeks under full-cost or real option investment rules.  Because growers
are assumed to be governed by “correct” decision making criteria, this extra delay explains our
observation that growers are investing at a slower rate than we would expect, or hope. 
ó  
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Table 3. Optimal Investment Timing for NPV and Real Option Criteria
The values in this table represent the real option time before investment should be undertaken. The base scenario
isó = 0.002 and ö =-0.107
Consistent with the option-value sensitivity analysis presented in table 2, the extent of the hy-
steretic effect rises in the level of on-going uncertainty, but is somewhat insensitive to changes
in the shock to returns.  If the real option value rises, then a higher investment trigger value me-
ans that it will take longer for the random returns process to incite new investments.  Higher
volatility always leads to higher option prices.  In order to increase the rate of investment, the-
refore, it is necessary to either take measures that reduce the underlying volatility of returns, or
to provide incentives for growers to adopt measures that improve the profitability of returns to
food safety investments. We explore some alternatives in the concluding section below. 
Conclusions 
In this study, we show that investments in food safety technology or processes involve a signi-
ficant real option value.  More importantly, the existence of this option value gives rise to a hy-
steretic effect.  If a real option exists, then current returns must exceed not only the
currentperiod opportunity cost of the investment total, but the value of the option as well.
Waiting for the stochastic returns process to exceed this new, higher trigger means that the de-
cision to make the investment will be delayed until the random process happens to exceed the
upper trigger limit. This delay is hysteresis, or inertia of the status quo. Although there are many
other reasons growers may be reluctant to commit large sums of money to a new project like
this, such as liquidity constraints, free riding on the other investors or a lack of market know-
ledge, our option value explanation provides a compelling, rigorous argument based in the theo-
ry of derivative pricing. 
The policy implications of these results are clear.  The existence of a real option means that in-
vestments will be rationally delayed by private decision makers relative to what would seem to
be optimal under traditional NPV rules.  If policymakers believe that this constitutes a market
failure – a dynamic externality akin to a common property problem – then measures that either
reduce the sunk costs of making food safety investments or reduce the uncertainty of the expec-
ted returns should be put in place.  Examples of policies that may reduce the fixed costs of in-
vestment include establishing standards for monitoring technology, licensing third-party testing
Traditional NPV 
Rules   0.0005   0.001  0.002  0.003  0.004  
-0.010   3.509   4.137  4.647  4.549  3.490  
ö  
-0.050 -0.107  
5.490 4.988   3.157 3.255  3.784 3.725  4.039 3.373  4.637 
4.549  
  -0.150   2.961   3.588  3.706  3.667  4.000  
  -0.200   3.843   4.529  3.314  3.274  4.157  
  Real Option 
Rules   0.0005   0.001  0.002  0.003  0.004  
ö  
-0.010 -0.050  
18.490 20.119   19.529 19.392  23.706 21.549  24.353 21.843  23.412 
23.490  
  -0.107   23.118   19.647  19.373  22.314  20.529  
  -0.150   22.020   19.725  21.451  21.451  27.706  
  -0.200   22.882   19.941  19.392  20.157  25.333  
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services to reduce search costs or providing extension services to inform growers and proces-
sors of alternative technologies that may be available.  Policies that reduce uncertainty are likely
more difficult to implement. Examples include increasing funds for federal testing (to raise the
probability that violators are caught), providing incentives for the development of better trace-
back technology or increasing fines for handlers found to be in violation of existing food safety
standards.  Ultimately, however, the problem remains one that industry members should re-
cognize themselves and be able to address within the existing framework of marketing orders
and information-sharing agreements within state-based commodity commissions.      
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